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2  Opportunities in Africa’s Growing  Urban Food Markets
 David Tschirley, Nicolas Bricas2, Christine Sauer1, and Thomas Reardon1
Key messages12
1 Africa’s rate of urbanization has been faster, and its urban population is higher, than reflected in of-ficial data. Combined with substantial growth in real per capita incomes over the past 20 years, this 
has contributed to rapid transformation in the continent’s agri-food system, presenting new chal-
lenges for farmers, consumers, and agribusinesses as well as a wide array of new opportunities. 
2 Despite considerable variety in food cultures across Africa, changes in food consumption behav-ior across the continent have trended broadly towards more purchased, more perishable, more 
processed, and more prepared foods. 
3 Employment in post-farm segments of the agri-food system (trade, processing, storage, distribu-tion, retailing, and food preparation), which currently account for about 25% of all employment, 
will likely grow more rapidly than employment on the farm.
4 . Expected shifts in farm production towards higher value crops — such as animal products (poultry and eggs, dairy, and meat), fresh fruit and vegetables — have proven spotty and modest to date, 
though over time these shifts are likely to become more pronounced and broad-based. 
5 Serving Africa’s urban food demand requires more capital intensity and greater knowledge, skill, and organization. As a result, only a small subset of the hundreds of millions of smallholder farm-
ers and micro- and small-scale agribusiness entrepreneurs will be able to compete effectively in 
this new environment over the medium term. 
6 Looking forward, the continent finds itself at a point of profound uncertainty, in the midst of a five-year stagnation of per capita income growth, and dealing now with the massive challenge 
of the COVID-19 pandemic accentuated by severe regional crises in the Sahel (security) and 
East Africa (the locust outbreak). Yet there is great room for growth through improved policies 
and productive investment, and some evidence that these are beginning to emerge. In the 
current environment, these levers will be increasingly urgent to support ongoing food system 
transformation and improve citizens’ livelihoods in Africa.
1 Michigan State University
2 Université Montpellier, CIRAD, UMR Moisa, Montpellier, France
3  Competitiveness of African Food Systems  with International Imports
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2.1 Introduction
Africa’s rapid urbanization, combined with 
substantial growth in real per capita incomes 
over the past 20 years and the globalization of 
food markets, is a major contributor to the rapid 
transformation taking place in the continent’s food 
systems (McMillan & Harttgen, 2014; Reardon, 
et. al., 2019; Tschirley, Dolislager, et al., 2015; 
Young, 2012). Together, these dynamics are 
confronting rural and urban people alike with new 
challenges while also providing a wide array of 
new opportunities. The purpose of this chapter is 
to better understand these new opportunities, the 
contribution that urbanization is making to them, 
and how they might evolve over the next 10 years. 
The chapter makes three contributions to the 
literature. First, it assesses the implications for food 
systems of insights from new spatial data on human 
settlement on the continent, which goes beyond 
the increasingly inadequate rural/urban dichotomy. 
This provides new insights about emerging 
new opportunities and about the policies and 
investments that may be needed to adapt to and 
take advantage of these patterns. 
Second, it brings together highly complementary–
but to date separate–findings on changing diets in 
East and Southern Africa compared to West Africa, 
and thereby provides the most comprehensive 
view to date of this central driver of changing 
opportunities for food system participants on the 
continent. 
Third, the chapter addresses the faltering of per 
capita income growth on the continent since 20133, 
together with the enormous global shock of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, to think critically about how 
3  McMillan, Rodrik, and Sepulveda (2017) note the faltering 
starting around mid-decade and find little reason for opti-
mism going forward; Sy and Talvi (2016) note that the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts for growth in Africa 
in 2016 were the lowest since 1999; World Bank data (https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=chart) 
show a flattening of real per capita purchasing power parity 
(PPP)  gross domestic product (GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa 
since 2014 and a slight but steady decline in real per capita 
USD GDP since the same year. In this chapter, we use World 
Bank data on per capita consumption expenditure, which 
show decline after 2013. 
the ongoing transformation of African food systems 
might differ over the next 10 years compared to 
what has been seen over the past 10–20 years. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains 
our conceptual approach; Section 3 reviews 
the empirical record on patterns of change in 
human settlement and per capita incomes on 
the continent; Section 4 lays out the expected 
impacts of these patterns of change on consumer 
behavior (changing consumer demand for food 
and its characteristics); Section 5 assesses the 
consequences of consumer behavioral change for 
the distribution of livelihood opportunities across 
the food system (and the participants at each level) 
and across rural-to-urban space; and Section 6 
concludes by considering what the implications of 
recent faltering in per capita consumption growth, 
together with the COVID-19 pandemic, might mean 
for the trajectory of food system transformation 
over the next 10 years.
2.2 Conceptual approach
In a market-based economy, labor must follow the 
structure of consumer demand4. The distribution of 
demand for labor — across sectors, levels of supply 
chains, and by skill requirement and wage level (or 
profitability, if self-employment) — then defines the 
structure of livelihood opportunities available to the 
system’s participants. Over time, forces of change 
external to the system influence the structure of 
demand and change the set of available livelihood 
opportunities. 
In this chapter, we consider the impact of two forces 
of change on the structure of African consumers’ 
demand for food and on the resulting distribution 
of livelihood opportunities: urbanization and 
income growth. These ongoing forces of change 
alter behavior in the form of transformed diets 
and related changes of structure and behavior in 
the food supply chains (FSCs) that support them. 
4 Changing technology – in particular, differing capital intensi-
ties across sectors of the economy and levels of supply chains 
— mediates the impact of demand on the distribution of 
labor. Treating this aspect systematically is beyond the scope 
of this chapter, though we will refer to it when especially rele-
vant. 
27AFRICA AGRICULTURE STATUS REPORT 2020
These diet and FSC transformations then alter 
opportunities for farmers, rural residents in general, 
and operators throughout the FSCs and in rural 
and urban areas in three ways: the magnitude of 
opportunities, their range or diversity, and their 
location within the FSCs and the broader economy. 
Our thesis is that urbanization and income 
growth lead to broadly predictable patterns of 
transformation of diets and of FSCs, and that clear 
expectations can be formed regarding the effects 
of these transformations on the level, diversity, and 
distribution of opportunities. In looking forward, 
we consider these broad dynamics of change 
together with the concept of local food cultures, 
and evidence for their persistence, to consider what 
aspects of these transformations are generalizable 
and thus predictable, which are subject to more 
local influence, and what this implies about the 
evolution of the system over time. 
We ask two broad questions: (1) to what extent are 
the observed patterns of change in Africa over the 
past decades consistent with these expectations, 
and how deep and broad have these changes 
been?; and (2) in light of the answer to the first 
questions, where might this process lead over the 
next 10 years? 
To explore these questions, we do three things. 
First, we empirically examine patterns of change in: 
(a) the speed and spatial distribution of change in 
human settlement patterns in Africa since 1960; and 
(b) consumer expenditure (as the best cross-country 
proxy for income5) and its distribution between rural 
and urban areas since 1980. To examine human 
settlement patterns, we use spatial data sets rather 
than official administrative data on rural and urban 
populations. 
Second, we characterize the evidence regarding 
the transformation of African diets over the past 
10–20 years, hypothesize what the effects of these 
5 Changes in per capita GDP can be a poor indicator of chang-
es in consumer well-being, due to changes in the capital 
intensity of an economy and thus the distribution of national 
income across labor and capital. See Arndt, McKay, and Tarp 
(2016) for a classification of African economies based in part 
on divergence between growth in GDP and growth in con-
sumption.
changes should be on the behavior–primarily the 
kinds of livelihoods they engage in–of farmers, 
rural residents in general, and entrepreneurs in 
FSCs, and review whether the empirical evidence 
conforms with our expectations. 
Finally, we speculate about how the processes 
documented in the chapter might play out over 
the next 10 years, and what this implies for policy 
and investment. In this last section, we emphasize 
the great uncertainty currently facing Africa and its 
cities due to growth faltering since 2013, and the 
potentially devastating impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on economic growth and livelihoods of 
the poorest6.
2.3 Patterns of change in 
urbanization and income 
growth
In this section we review the evidence on changes in 
human settlement patterns in Africa since 1960 using 
data from Africapolis (OECD/SWAC, 2020), then use 
data from World Bank7  to examine trends in per 
capita expenditure on the continent since 1980.
2.3.1 Five findings regarding change in human 
settlement patterns over the past several 
decades
Assessing the opportunities presented by African 
urban areas requires an accurate understanding of 
the patterns of urban settlement on the continent. 
Official urban and rural population data are 
inadequate to this task for three reasons. First, they 
are inconsistent across countries, with differing 
national cutoffs for the minimum size of settlement 
that qualify as “urban” (from as low as 5,000 to as 
high as 20,000). Comparison across countries is thus 
problematic. 
Second, urban areas in official data are defined 
administratively, not based on observed settlement 
patterns of people. This has led to two types 
6 Evidence suggests that urbanization will continue in Africa 
even if income growth slows. See Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath 
(2016) and Jedwab and Vollrath (2015) on the conundrum of 
past urbanization in the absence of rapid income growth. 
7 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.TOTL.KD, file 
API_NE.CON.TOTL.KD_DS2_en_excel_v2_1129220
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We use these data plus WorldPop10 data on 
overall human settlement in Africa to examine how 
settlement patterns have changed over time. We 
reach five conclusions, each discussed in turn. 
Finding #1: More rapid urban growth and higher 
urban populations: The first conclusion is that 
urban populations have grown more rapidly and 
are now much higher than shown in official data as 
compiled by the UN. Comparing Africapolis data to 
the United Nations/World Urbanization Prospects 
(UN/WUP), Table 2.1 shows that urban populations 
under Africapolis in 2015 are nearly 90 million, or 
20%, higher than under UN/WUP data, and their 
share in total population is 49%, compared to only 
41% in UN/WUP. 
Growth rates in Africapolis are uniformly higher 
starting each decade through 2015. Notably, UN/
WUP data show a slight slowing in urban population 
growth rates over time (falling from 4.1% for 
1960–2015 to only 3.7% from 2000 to 2015), while 
Africapolis shows steady (and higher) rates starting 
in 1960 through 1990, then sharp increases starting 
in 2000. These two data sets thus paint quite 
different pictures of current urbanization dynamics 
on the continent, with Africapolis suggesting that 
the continent is already half urban, and that the 
continuing rate of urbanization is much more rapid 
than previously thought. 
Finding #2: Decentralized growth — the 
role of new urban agglomerations, many not 
administratively recognized: The second finding 
is that a major driver of this rapid growth has been 
the rise of thousands of new urban agglomerations, 
many not officially recognized as “urban”. Africa 
has experienced a dramatically more decentralized 
urbanization process than is typically appreciated or 
visible through official data (Table 2.2). The number 
of agglomerations above the Africapolis cutoff of 
10,000 expanded by 15 times across the continent 
between 1950 and 2015, from just under 500 to over 
7,600; in sub-Saharan Africa the number expanded 
10 https://www.worldpop.org/, population data downloadable at 
https://www.worldpop.org/project/categories?id=3. See also 
https://www.worldpop.org/methods for details and citations 
on methods. See Arslan, Tschirley, and Egger (2020) and IFAD 
(2019) for applications. 
of misclassification of physical spaces and their 
populations: administratively “urban” areas around 
many city and town cores that enter official urban 
population numbers but are functionally rural in 
terms of population density and predominant 
livelihoods; and sizeable agglomerations of people 
emerging in rural areas that for extended periods 
are not recognized administratively as urban and 
therefore do not enter official statistics on urban 
populations (see OECD/SWAC (2020, Table 4.1, p. 
113) for examples from across the continent). 
The third weakness in official data is that cross-
country data sets on urban settlements from the 
United Nations typically include only settlements 
above populations of 300,0008. This means that the 
potentially large number of people living in urban 
settlements below this size cannot be examined in a 
cross-country setting, even if they are recognized as 
urban at country level. 
The Africapolis data set9 addresses these problems 
by combining demographic data, satellite and 
aerial imagery, and other cartographic information 
around a standardized spatial definition of “urban”. 
The system generates estimates of the number of 
urban agglomerations, the population of each, and 
total urban population at 10-year intervals for every 
country on the continent since 1950. Africapolis 
defines as “urban” an agglomeration of at least 
10,000 people that meets specified criteria of overall 
density and built-up area. Because Africapolis 
uses administrative classification as one layer of 
information, its urban agglomerations include but are 
not limited to administratively urban areas. The result 
is a time series with, as of 2018, over 7,500 urban 
agglomerations across Africa, with total population, 
spatial extent, and spatial location of each. 
8 The UN agglomeration level data includes only cities above 
300,000; see https://population.un.org/wup/Download/, file 
15 or 16 under Urban Agglomerations. The country level 
urbanization data by city size class includes a class of “under 
300,000”. But unlike all the other, larger, size classes, it does 
not provide data on the number of agglomerations of this 
size, only an overall estimate of total population in the class 
and its share in overall population. Exactly how these overall 
estimates are generated is not clear. 
9 https://africapolis.org/home, data downloadable at https://
africapolis.org/home/data. See OECD/SWAC (2020) for more 
on methods and key patterns. The spreadsheet used to gen-
erate results in this chapter is available upon request. 
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by 21 times, from under 280 to nearly 5,800. Just from 
1990 to 2015, the number expanded by a factor of 
2.8 on the continent and 3.3 in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The emergence of these new agglomerations 
accounted for 20% of all urban population growth 
since 1950 (21% in sub-Saharan Africa), and the 
same percent since 1990, driven by steady annual 
growth of slightly more than 4% in the number of 
agglomerations. This means that there has been 
no recent slowing of the contribution of new urban 
agglomerations, compared to existing ones, to total 
urban population growth. This rapid and spatially 
dispersed emergence of urban agglomerations is 
taking place in the midst of rural areas (a process 
Africapolis calls in situ urbanization; OECD/SWAC, 
2020), with major implications for the accessibility 
of urban markets to farmers and also for urban 
infrastructural investment policy. 
Table 2.1. Urban populations, share in total, and annual percent growth to 2015, Africapolis versus UN/WUP 
(1960–2015)
Africapolis UN/WUP
Urban 
population 
(’000)
Share in 
total (%)
Annual 
average 
growth to 
2015 (%)
Urban 
population 
(’000)
Share in 
total (%)
Annual average 
growth to 2015 
(%)
1960 41,905 17 4.9 52,072 19 4.1
1970 68,161 21 4.8 81,057 23 4.0
1980 109,953 26 4.8 126,082 27 3.9
1990 170,517 30 4.9 196,050 32 3.7
2000 258,703 36 5.4 280,008 35 3.7
2010 411,847 43 6.6 399,735 39 3.8
2015 567,115 49 --- 480,785 41 ---
Note: Table includes North African countries; 50 countries in total across the continent.
Table 2.2. Growth in urban agglomerations in Africa and contribution of new and existing agglomerations to 
growth of urban population (1950–2015)
Number of 
agglomerations
Contribution to urban population growth
New  
agglomerations (%)
Existing  
agglomerations (%)
1950 1990 2015 1950–2015 1990–2015 1950–2015 1990–2015
African continent 498 2705 7617 20 20 80 80
Sub Saharan Africa 277 1769 5779 21 21 79 79
Central 26 223 873 22 23 78 77
East 42 333 1483 22 22 78 78
North 221 936 1838 17 14 83 86
Southern 56 249 936 28 29 72 71
West 153 964 2487 18 17 82 83
Notes: (1) Africapolis cutoff for urban agglomeration is 10,000; see OECD/SWAC (2020) for more detail.
Source: Africapolis (https://www.africapolis.org/home) and downloadable data set
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Finding #3: The accelerating emergence of 
megacities: Despite Africa’s highly decentralized 
urbanization, the continent has seen the emergence 
of many “megacities” (Figure 2.1). Cities of more 
than 5 million rose from zero in 1960 to 2 in 2000 
(Cairo and Alexandria) and 11 by 2015. Using a 
cutoff of 2 million, Africa had one megacity in 1950 
(Cairo). The continent did not get its second until 
1970 (Johannesburg), and by 2015 had 42. 
The population in cities of this size is growing very 
rapidly and the pace of growth is increasing. For 
example, population in the 11 cities of 5 million or 
more grew at over 11% per annum from 2000 to 
2015, versus only 6.4% from 1970 to 2015; the share 
of urban population in these cities rose from 8% in 
1970 to 17% in 2015. Using 2 million as the cutoff, 
population grew 7.7% annually from 2000 to 2015 
versus 7.3% from 1960, and the share in total urban 
population in these 42 cities rose from 9% in 1960 to 
33% in 2015. 
Finding #4: Continuing importance of medium 
and smaller cities and towns: Despite the rise of 
megacities, over half (52% both continentally and 
in sub-Saharan Africa) of Africa’s urban population 
in 2015 resided in towns and small cities of less 
than 500,000 population. Even towns under 100,000 
population accounted for nearly one-third of the 
urban population. Though this share is declining, 
this category of smaller cities and towns — many 
of them only recently emerging as urban areas 
— will remain for many years tremendously 
important in determining the opportunities that 
African urbanization provides for its food system 
participants. They must therefore figure prominently 
on the urban policy and investment agenda of 
African governments. In fact, these smaller cities 
and towns, being closer to rural areas than the 
emerging megacities, in many ways already play 
an outsize role in creating such opportunities by 
making migratory options more accessible to 
more people and resulting in substantial poverty 
reduction (Christiaensen, DeWeerdt, & Todo, 2013; 
Christiaensen & Todo, 2014).
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Figure 2.1. Number of cities above 2 million and  
5 million in Africa, 1960–2015
Source: Africapolis data
Finding #5: Rural densification and the blurring 
of rural–urban distinctions: Rural populations 
have become dramatically more dense in recent 
decades. This dynamic is still poorly understood but 
emerges clearly from the WorldPop global spatial 
settlement data. For example, Arslan, Tschirley, and 
Egger (2020) and IFAD (2019) show that two-thirds 
of rural youth live on only 8% of the populated rural 
land, meaning that average population densities for 
these two-thirds are more than 23 times higher than 
for the most remote one-third11. Jayne, Chamberlin, 
and Headey (2014) show that 82% of Africa’s rural 
population reside on only 20% of the rural land, 
and 62% reside on only 10%. These figures lead 
to similar conclusions about relative densities of 
African rural population settlement. 
This pattern is functionally related to the rise of 
new agglomerations and Africa’s decentralized 
urbanization process, as increasing rural 
populations eventually reach densities that must be 
considered functionally urban (OECD/SWAC, 2020). 
The distinction between rural and urban areas thus 
becomes blurred: densifying rural areas are likely to 
take on increasingly urban characteristics, especially 
with respect to their engagement with markets as 
consumers, while new urban agglomerations are 
likely to have relatively low densities compared to 
other urban areas and to support more agriculture-
related livelihoods than traditional cities. We revisit 
these ideas in section 4 regarding expected effects 
of observed settlement patterns on behavior of 
consumers and FSC participants. 
11  (0.67/0.08)/(0.33/0.92) = 23.3. 
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Figure 2.2. Per capita final consumer expenditure in constant 2010 USD, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1981–2018
Source: World Bank Indicators, Final consumption expenditure estimated from national accounts data (excel file API_NE.CON.TOTL.
KD_DS2_en_excel_v2_1129220).
2.4 Income growth boomed 
from 2000, with urban 
areas likely benefiting 
most, but has faltered since 
2013
We use World Bank per capita final consumption 
expenditure rather than per capita GDP as GDP 
includes returns to capital that will have much less 
impact on the behavior of consumers, and thus 
on the structure of food demand and resulting 
opportunities available to participants12. Resource-
rich countries in particular can see substantially 
higher growth in GDP than in consumption, as 
rents from the resource extraction leave the 
country, or are reinvested rather than spent, or are 
saved. 
Trends in income levels: prolonged boom 
followed by a bust: Figure 2.2 shows declining 
average real per capita consumption in sub-
Saharan Africa during the 1980s as a result of 
12 Both series come from national accounts data but use 
differing methods. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NE.CON.TOTL.KD, file API_NE.CON.TOTL.KD_DS2_en_
excel_v2_1129220 for consumption expenditure data used in 
this chapter.
the growth-inhibiting effects of previous policies 
and the roll-out of structural adjustment programs 
across the continent. This period was followed by 
over a decade of stagnation to 2000. From 2000 to 
2013, constant 2010 USD per capita consumption 
expenditure boomed, growing at an annual 
average rate of 3.14% and rising 50% from US$874 
to US$1,306. This boom in consumer expenditure, 
tied to urbanization and the accumulating response 
to the economic opening spurred by structural 
adjustment13, is what drove the transformations of 
diets and FSCs that we discuss next. 
Since 2013, however, average consumption 
expenditure has slowly declined14. Though growth 
did not decline in all countries, the downturn has 
been broad: of the 29 countries with data for the 
entire 2000–2018 period, 9 had higher growth 
13 See Sachs and Warner (1997) for the contribution of closed 
economic policy to the lack of growth on the continent 
before the mid-1990s. 
14 World Bank data on constant 2010 USD per capita GDP and 
constant 2017 PPP USD per capita GDP show an end to growth 
after 2014: 2010 USD shows slow decline from 2014 to 2019 
while the 2017 PPP USD shows a flat trend. These data are 
available to 2019 while the consumption data go only through 
2018 at the time of this writing. Files can be downloaded 
at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.
CD?view=chart
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Table 2.3. Urban and rural per capita expenditure in selected African countries, and urban-to-rural ratio (2010 PPP$)
Country
2010 per capita 
consumption, 
PPP$
Country
2010 per 
capita 
consumption, 
PPP$
Country
2010 per 
capita 
consumption, 
PPP$
  Rural Urban
U/R 
ratio Rural Urban
U/R 
ratio Rural Urban
U/R 
ratio
Ethiopia 1,048 1,440 1.37 Liberia 538 981 1.82 Togo 423 1,004 2.37
São Tomé 3,044 4,344 1.43 Tanzania 418 783 1.87 Niger 459 1,116 2.43
Nigeria 493 758 1.54 Côte d’Ivoire 891 1,761 1.98 Malawi 489 1,293 2.64
Congo 1,013 1,560 1.54 Ghana 875 1,826 2.09 Burundi 277 760 2.74
Gabon 1,698 2,635 1.55 Guinea 580 1,225 2.11 Cameroon 420 1,214 2.89
Benin 489 769 1.57 Lesotho 944 1,995 2.11 Kenya 572 1,661 2.90
Chad 694 1,097 1.58 Madagascar 210 457 2.18 Namibia 859 2,583 3.01
DRC 218 374 1.72 Uganda 796 1,788 2.25 Swaziland 626 1,919 3.07
The Gambia 818 1,440 1.76 Cabo Verde 1,307 2,975 2.28 Zambia 279 933 3.34
Mauritania 1,052 1,869 1.78 Senegal 592 1,367 2.31 RSA 1,598 5,467 3.42
Mozambique 453 811 1.79 Mali 427 988 2.31 Rwanda 294 1,552 5.28
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        Population-weighted ratio 2.08 
Source: World Bank, computed from household income-expenditure surveys.
after 2013 compared to before, but 20 had lower 
growth; and while only 1 of the 29 had negative 
growth before 2013, a total of 10 had negative 
growth since 2013. If this decline continues or 
becomes a prolonged stagnation, it puts at risk the 
transformations we discuss and clouds the picture of 
how rapidly cities can create new opportunities for 
food system participants15. 
Rural–urban comparison: urban areas are richer 
and have probably grown faster: Data do not 
allow a comparison of growth rates over time in 
consumption or income between urban and rural 
areas. Extensive research documents, however, 
much higher living standards in urban than in rural 
Africa (Sahn & Stifel, 2003), and the little available 
15  See Rodrik (2018) and McMillan et al. (2017) on Africa’s future 
growth prospects. None of these authors are optimistic that 
the rapid growth of 2000–2013 can be quickly rekindled. 
evidence suggests that this urban advantage is not 
declining over time. On the first question, the World 
Bank provides rural/urban consumption expenditure 
estimates for 2010 across 36 African countries, 
based on nationally representative household 
consumption or expenditure survey data sets (Table 
2.3). These data show that the ratio of urban-to-
rural consumption expenditure is above 1.0 in every 
country, ranging from a low of 1.37 in Ethiopia (a 
37% average income advantage for urban residents) 
to a high of 5.28 in Rwanda (a massive advantage for 
urban households, with average expenditure more 
than 5 times higher than rural). The population-
weighted mean ratio is 2.08, meaning that the 
average urban resident enjoys more than double 
the consumption expenditure of the average rural 
resident. 
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Sahn and Stifel (2003) show similar inequality between 
rural and urban areas in Africa, based on a multi-
dimensional measure of poverty. Across 6 countries, 
the smallest difference in asset poverty is 30%, and in 
half of the countries, asset poverty is more than 50% 
higher in rural areas than in urban areas. 
Surprisingly, the study by Sahn and Stifel (2003) 
is the only one we find that explored whether 
urban–rural disparities are declining or rising over 
time. Their general conclusion is that there is 
no evidence of rural areas catching up in Africa. 
Depending on the measure of welfare and which 
countries are examined, evidence can be strong 
that rural areas are falling further behind. 
2.4 Expected impacts on 
consumer behavior: the 
structure of demand for 
food and its characteristics
Our findings so far can be summarized in four broad 
patterns of change that will influence the behavior 
of food system participants and through this on 
opportunities to those participants. These shocks are:
•	 The share of population living in urban areas 
has risen rapidly, from less than one-third in 
1990 to one-half today (49% in 2015).
•	 Rural areas on average are now much closer 
to urban areas and are themselves much more 
densely populated.
•	 Megacities are rapidly increasing their popula-
tion share even as smaller cities and towns hold 
over half the continent’s urban population.
•	 Incomes rose rapidly from 2000 to 2013, proba-
bly more rapidly in urban than in rural areas.
These changes have predictable effects on 
consumer behavior, and these effects are largely 
borne-out by empirical study16. Tschirley (2017) 
has characterized changes in food consumption 
behavior on the continent as food becoming more 
16  The changing behavior and structure of FSCs is reviewed in 
Chapter 4 (this volume).
purchased, more perishable, more processed, 
and more prepared. He documents how deep 
and broad these patterns are across countries 
and across rural and urban areas in East and 
Southern Africa (Tschirley, Dolislager, Reardon, & 
Snyder, 2015; Tschirley, Snyder, et al., 2015). Bricas, 
Tchamda, and Mouton (2016) and Hollinger and 
Staatz (2015) do the same in West Africa. 
We treat each of these four patterns (purchasing, 
perishability, processing, and preparation) in turn, 
then close the section with a consideration of 
how more qualitative aspects of consumer food 
demand, in particular food safety, perceived quality, 
and “desirability”, are affected by urbanization, 
rural densification, and rising incomes. 
A key insight is that urbanization and income growth 
have independent effects on diets and thus, through 
FSC restructuring, on opportunities available to 
food system participants, but that together they 
have far higher combined effects. To take one 
example, consider the demand for convenience. 
A rural resident who migrates to an urban area will 
experience lifestyle changes that lead them to put 
a higher value on convenience, and to increase the 
share of convenient (typically processed or prepared) 
foods in their diet, even if their income does not 
increase (Huang & David, 1993; Regmi & Dyck, 2001). 
Similarly, a rural resident who sees their income rise 
but remains in the rural area may value convenience 
more due to a higher opportunity cost of time. Yet 
higher costs and (potentially) lower availability of 
processed and prepared foods in rural areas may 
limit the extent of this behavioral change. When 
urbanization and income growth occur together, their 
impact is far larger: an economist would compute the 
combined effect as the product of the independent 
impact of urbanization on demand for convenience 
and the pure income elasticity of demand for 
convenience. Transformation can thus be extremely 
rapid when the two complementary forces of change 
operate simultaneously. 
2.4.1 Purchased foods
Expectations: Greater reliance on purchased 
food follows directly from greater urbanization, 
greater density of rural settlements, and lesser 
Table 2.3. Urban and rural per capita expenditure in selected African countries, and urban-to-rural ratio (2010 PPP$)
Country
2010 per capita 
consumption, 
PPP$
Country
2010 per 
capita 
consumption, 
PPP$
Country
2010 per 
capita 
consumption, 
PPP$
  Rural Urban
U/R 
ratio Rural Urban
U/R 
ratio Rural Urban
U/R 
ratio
Ethiopia 1,048 1,440 1.37 Liberia 538 981 1.82 Togo 423 1,004 2.37
São Tomé 3,044 4,344 1.43 Tanzania 418 783 1.87 Niger 459 1,116 2.43
Nigeria 493 758 1.54 Côte d’Ivoire 891 1,761 1.98 Malawi 489 1,293 2.64
Congo 1,013 1,560 1.54 Ghana 875 1,826 2.09 Burundi 277 760 2.74
Gabon 1,698 2,635 1.55 Guinea 580 1,225 2.11 Cameroon 420 1,214 2.89
Benin 489 769 1.57 Lesotho 944 1,995 2.11 Kenya 572 1,661 2.90
Chad 694 1,097 1.58 Madagascar 210 457 2.18 Namibia 859 2,583 3.01
DRC 218 374 1.72 Uganda 796 1,788 2.25 Swaziland 626 1,919 3.07
The Gambia 818 1,440 1.76 Cabo Verde 1,307 2,975 2.28 Zambia 279 933 3.34
Mauritania 1,052 1,869 1.78 Senegal 592 1,367 2.31 RSA 1,598 5,467 3.42
Mozambique 453 811 1.79 Mali 427 988 2.31 Rwanda 294 1,552 5.28
Sierra Leone 1,010 1,832 1.81 Burkina 400 932 2.33
        Population-weighted ratio 2.08 
Source: World Bank, computed from household income-expenditure surveys.
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average distances from rural to urban areas. Urban 
households everywhere rely overwhelmingly on 
markets for their food; denser populations in 
rural areas reduce land per capita and increase 
opportunities for specialization, both of which drive 
greater reliance on food markets for consumption; 
and lesser average distances between rural and 
urban areas increases the influence of urban areas 
on rural, including allowing urban marketing 
networks to reach more rural areas. 
Empirical patterns: Patterns are remarkably similar 
across regions of the continent. From household 
surveys in West Africa, Cameroon, and Chad, Bricas 
et al. (2016) show that over 90% of food in major 
cities is purchased, more than 80% is purchased 
in secondary cities, and over half is purchased in 
rural areas. As causes of the high share in rural 
areas, they note the increase in urban settlements 
in the midst of rural areas (what Africapolis calls 
“in situ urbanization”), and the increasing share 
of non-farm labor in rural residents’ livelihoods. In 
five countries of East and Southern Africa (Ethiopia, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Malawi), 
Tschirley, Dolislager, et al. (2015) showed that, circa 
2010, in rural areas 44% of all consumed food was 
purchased; over 90% was purchased in urban areas. 
Later analysis that included Nigeria and Zambia 
pushed the share of purchased food in total food in 
rural areas to nearly 50% (Tschirley, 2017). 
2.4.2 Perishable foods and other non-staples
Expectations: Bennett and Pierce (1954) first 
documented the move away from starchy staples 
towards more perishable foods as incomes rise, 
a pattern now identified as Bennett’s Law. These 
perishable foods include animal proteins, including 
fish, meat, poultry, eggs, and dairy, and fresh fruit 
and vegetables. 
Empirical patterns: Perhaps surprisingly, empirical 
evidence on this pattern in Africa is mixed. The 
most robust pattern is towards animal proteins. 
Calculations from annex data in Tschirley, Snyder, et 
al., (2015) show that these items occupied 20% of 
all food purchases in Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia around 2010. 
Bricas et al. (2016) in West Africa showed similar 
results — these same categories accounted for 15–
30% of all food consumption (including consumed 
own production) in West Africa between 2001 and 
2011. Hollinger and Staatz (2015) also found similar 
results for the region, and show that this share rose 
in urban areas of every country (Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal) between 1994 
and the mid- to late 2000s (though it fell in rural 
areas of three of the five countries). They show that 
meat and dairy (separately) have income elasticities 
of demand above 1.0 in 26 out of 28 country-by-
rural/urban combinations for the 2 food items. 
Income elasticities for fish typically hover between 
0.9 and 1.2. Across income quintiles, meat and 
dairy budget shares rose with rising income in every 
country (these are not computed for fish). Overall, 
these results strongly suggest that demand for 
animal protein will grow rapidly with income. 
The patterns for fruit and vegetables are not as 
clear. Hollinger and Staatz (2015, Table A6.2 and 
A6.2) found a mix of modestly rising and declining 
shares with income in both urban and rural areas of 
six countries of West Africa. The strongest evidence 
of rising shares was in Niger, the poorest country 
in the group, where shares rose most sharply with 
income but from very low levels. Bricas et al. (2016, 
Graphique 21) show lower budget shares (but 
potentially higher total consumption) of fresh fruits 
and vegetables in urban areas of West Africa than in 
rural areas. 
Even steady budget shares, however, imply rapidly 
rising per capita consumption of these items as 
incomes rise. Income elasticities are 1.0 or greater in 
8 out of 14 country-by-rural/urban combinations, but 
never less than 0.7. When combined with rapid rises 
in urban populations, these patterns produce even 
more rapid growth in total demand. 
Trends for fruit likely differ from those for vegetables, 
yet the two are typically reported as one group. 
Tschirley, Dolislager, et al. (2015) distinguished 
between them in East and Southern Africa and 
found slowly falling shares for vegetables with 
income (from 11% among the poor to 9% among the 
upper class; note that this implies higher absolute 
consumption of vegetables among the upper class) 
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but large rises (from a lower base) in the share of 
fruits. Tschirley, Cunguara, Haggblade, Reardon, and 
Kondo (2017) estimate expenditure elasticities in 
Tanzania of 1.32 and 1.07 for fruit in rural and urban 
areas respectively and for vegetables of 0.62 and 
0.77. Overall, these sources suggest that demand for 
fruit should rise rapidly with incomes, while demand 
for fresh vegetables will rise, but much more slowly. 
Finally, trends on the share of staples in African diets 
show modest change. Reardon et al. (2019) used 
FAOSTAT data to show that the share of cereals 
declined very little between 1970 and 2013 (from 
28% to 26%), roots and tubers remained steady 
around 20%, and non-staple shares rose from 50% to 
55%. 
2.4.3 Processed and prepared foods
Expectations: Urban lifestyles are busier and urban 
residents on average have much higher incomes 
than rural residents. Limited time and high incomes 
increase the opportunity cost of time, especially 
for women. The result is that consumers seek 
convenience in many things, including food. This 
search for convenience is at the root of the rapid 
rise in demand for processed food documented 
across all regions of Africa, particularly for highly 
processed foods and food away from home. 
Empirical patterns: Processed foods: Across 16 
countries of West Africa, Bricas et al. (2016) found 
that processed foods account for at least 48% 
of all consumption in rural areas, at least 56% in 
secondary cities, and at least 62% in primary cities 
(Graphique 32) 17. Using a different classification 
scheme to that used by Tschirley, Dolislager, et al. 
(2015), they found that foods processed by small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs; the “artisanal 
processing” category in Figure 2.3) (which will 
correspond primarily to moderately processed 
foods in the Tschirley, Dolislager, et al. 2015 
classification) show roughly constant shares of 
more than 20% across rural and urban areas, while 
the share of industrially processed foods (relating 
primarily to the more highly processed category 
in Tschirley, Dolislager, et al., 2015) rises from 10% 
in rural areas to about 15% in secondary cities and 
21% in primary cities (Figure 2.3). They found similar 
behavior across income groups, with the small-scale 
processed category remaining steady around 20%, 
while the industrially processed share rises from 
12% in the poorest quintile to about 18% in the top 
quintile. 
Tschirley, Dolislager, et al. (2015) found similar 
patterns in East and Southern Africa (Figure 
2.4). They show that purchased processed foods 
account for nearly two-thirds of all consumption in 
urban areas and 30% in rural areas. As a share of 
purchased foods, the shares are nearly identical in 
urban and rural areas at 70%. 
17  They include a category for products whose origin is mixed 
or unknown — we exclude these shares in what we quote 
above. 
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The difference emerges in the degree of 
processing. The share of more highly processed 
foods in food purchases is lower in rural areas, at 
33%, compared to 42% in urban areas. Yet across 
income levels, these shares behave nearly the 
same in rural and urban areas: the purchased food 
budget share of more highly processed foods rises 
from 36% to 65% across urban income classes, 
and from 30% to 52% in rural areas. Meanwhile, 
the share of moderately processed foods falls with 
income in urban areas, from 30% among the poor 
to 20% among the upper class, and remains steady 
at just under 40% across all income levels in rural 
areas. 
Empirical patterns: Food away from home: 
Consumption of food away from home shows 
very similar patterns in West Africa and East and 
Southern Africa: low overall shares around 2010 
(circa 2%) hiding great variation across countries 
and a very strong positive relationship to income 
and urbanization. In West Africa, food and food 
away from home shares were estimated by Bricas et 
al. (2016) at only about 2% regionally, rising to 6% in 
major cities, but varying within cities from only 5% 
in Freetown and Conakry to over 30% in Cotonou, 
Lomé, and Abidjan. Tschirley, Snyder, et al. (2015) 
likewise show about a 2% share overall in their 6 
countries, but Reardon et al. (2019) and Sauer et 
al. (2019) found much higher shares in Nigeria (not 
included in the Tschirley, Dolislager, et al, 2015 work) 
and Tanzania — about 25% in urban areas and 10% 
in rural areas. In Nigeria, the share doubles from 
the lowest to highest income tercile — this implies 
explosive growth in total expenditure on this item 
with growing incomes. Tschirley, Snyder, et al. (2015) 
found a similar pattern with income, projecting 
higher growth rates over time (based on income 
elasticities and rates of urbanization) for food away 
from home than for any other food category and 
even slightly above demand growth for non-food. 
2.4.4.  Food diversity, quality, safety, and 
desirability
Expectations: Bennett’s Law can be extended and 
generalized into an expectation of rising demand 
for food diversity (this follows directly from a 
declining budget share of starchy staples) and for 
a broader set of food attributes as incomes rise. 
Key among these attributes are perceived food 
safety and quality (including nutrition) and complex 
notions of food desirability. 
Food desirability includes internal factors such as 
taste, texture, aroma, palatability and (for non-
packaged foods) visual appeal, and external factors 
such as the perceived status or prestige of foods, 
their relationship to existing cultural norms around 
food, and one’s desired lifestyle18. In the globalized, 
industrialized, market-based food system that now 
dominates global consumption, lifestyle advertising 
by large multinational food corporations (both 
western and African, for example Tiger Brands 
18  This conception builds on Herforth and Ahmed (2015).
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of South Africa and Bakhresa Group of Tanzania) 
directly targets all these aspects of desirability, and 
does so especially for ultra-processed industrial 
food products (Abrahams, Temple, Mchiza, & Nelia, 
2017; Gaber & Write, 2014; Igumbor et al., 2012; 
Ng et al., 2014). Most obviously, it targets external 
aspects such as perceived status or prestige and 
the role of the product in one’s desired lifestyle. Yet 
over time, and especially when targeted at children, 
such advertising can heavily influence internal 
factors such as what is considered a desirable 
taste or texture or smell (Robinson, Borzekowski, & 
Matheson, 2007; Smith, Kelly, Yeatman, & Boyland, 
2019). 
Because this advertising takes place within a local 
food culture, one should expect variability over 
space and time in how these externally promoted 
foods and food products are adopted into diets. 
Spatially, differing local food cultures should drive 
variation in the particular products adopted and 
the particular ways in which they are combined with 
“local” and “traditional” foods to create new dishes 
(Bricas, 2008; Bricas & O’Déyé, 1985; Soula, Yount-
André, & Bricas, 2020). One can also expect that 
strongly embedded local values around food might 
slow the adoption of ultra-processed foods in some 
areas, even controlling for levels of income. 
Much innovation around food and eating takes 
place within households or among small-scale 
street vendors. This innovation has to do with how 
foods are combined and prepared into dishes and 
may be relatively free of large corporate influence. 
Examples include the expansion of fried plantain 
banana (aloko) all over West Africa, attiéke made 
from cassava semolina in Côte d’Ivoire and now in 
other countries (Sédia, Konan, & Akindès, 2020); rice 
and fish with oil and vegetables (ceebu jën) in urban 
Senegal (Bricas & O’Déyé, 1985), and baabenda, 
a vegetable leaves dish, in urban Burkina Faso 
(Héron, 2020).
Urbanization increases exposure to other people 
and their food habits and to modern media, 
from billboards to TV advertising to smartphone 
advertisements and embedded advertisements in 
movies and online shows. In this way, urbanization 
per se should simultaneously increase the influence 
of the large corporate sector and of more organic 
national and regional influences that depend on 
the mixing of people and informal sharing of “food 
styles” (Bricas, 2008; Bricas & O’Déyé, 1985; Soula 
et al., 2020). 
We expect that these forces will result in great 
spatial variation in the particular foods and food 
products that are adopted into diets and the dishes 
that they support, but that this variability will be 
found in the midst of very robust convergence 
towards food being more purchased, perishable, 
processed, and prepared (Tschirley, 2017). More 
specifically, we expect the demand for status and 
prestige through food, or for “lifestyle foods”, to 
start with iconic global brands such as Coca-Cola 
(beverages), Frito-Lay (snack foods), and Kentucky 
Fried Chicken (fast food). As this happens, local 
firms will find a niche, for example Chicken Republic 
in Ghana, Nando’s in South Africa, and Azam in 
Tanzania. Street foods will also grow and innovate 
to adapt to these trends, but this sector and small 
local firms will be heavily pressed to compete with 
larger firms. Over time, as incomes rise and as 
intensified by urbanization, concepts of desirability 
will change.  We expect that they will move back 
towards foods perceived as more healthy but that 
still have high processing content or are prepared 
outside the home. These features are essential 
for convenience, which is a driving force in urban 
food demand. We also expect that in most cases 
these foods will feature strong advertising content, 
which is needed to penetrate the “noise” of 
product diversity in modern systems and capture 
aspirational demand of high-income consumers). 
The rate at which this happens will vary depending 
on the rate of income growth and the strength of 
local food cultures.
Empirical patterns: Extensive research exists on 
consumer willingness to pay for food quality but 
generalizing is difficult due to the large number 
of characteristics that can be considered under 
the rubric of quality. The literature includes 
examinations of fortified versus unfortified maize 
meal in Kenya (De Groote, Kimenju, & Morawetz, 
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2011); genetically modified foods in Kenya (Kimenju 
& De Groote, 2008), rice quality in Senegal (Demont 
et al., 2013); quality protein maize in Tanzania (Kiria, 
Vermeulen, & De Groote, 2010); Karoo Lamb in 
South Africa (Van Zyl, Vermeulen, & Kirsten, 2013); 
African green leafy vegetables in Kenya (Chelang’a, 
Obare, & Kimenju, 2013; Ngigi, Okello, Lagerkvist, 
Karanja, & Mburu, 2011) and in South Africa 
(Senyolo, Wale, & Ortmann, 2014), and organic 
foods in South Africa (Vermeulen & Bienabe, 2007). 
Empirical research on demand for food safety in 
Africa is scarce. Ortega and Tschirley (2017) found 
that consumer awareness of food safety issues is 
lower in Africa than in Asia and found little empirical 
evidence of consumer demand for food safety in 
Africa. Hoffman, Moser, and Saak (2019) reviewed 
six studies of consumer willingness to pay for food 
safety. Four of the studies are in Africa and all of 
these are in Kenya. They conclude that African 
(Kenyan) consumers have low knowledge of food 
safety and low willingness to pay for it. 
Research on perceptions of status, prestige, and 
lifestyle as drivers of food consumption is nearly 
absent in Africa’s food economics literature, despite 
the growing ubiquity of global brands of beverages, 
snack foods, and fast foods on the continent, and of 
advertising associated with each. Given the rapidly 
unfolding nutrition transition in Africa and the 
increase in overweight and obesity and associated 
non-communicable diseases (Reardon et al., 
2020), this should be an area of rapidly increasing 
research19. 
2.4.5 Megacities and consumer food demand
Little literature exists on the relationship between 
patterns of food consumption and city size. Sauer 
et al. (2019) found a threshold effect of the size 
of urban agglomeration on demand for highly 
19 We found only one example of research on food advertising 
in Africa outside of South Africa: a letter to the editor (not an 
article) in Food and Nutrition Bulletin focused on billboard 
advertising in Maputo, Mozambique (Pinto, Lunet, Williams, 
& Barros, 2007). Not a single paper citing this work picks-up 
on the advertising angle. See Igumbor et al. (2012), Moodley, 
Christofides, Norris, Achia, and Hofman (2015), and Cassim 
(2005) for South Africa. Use of the term “aspirational foods” 
remains rare in research on Africa, one exception being Colen 
et al. (2018), though they do not link this to advertising. 
processed food in Tanzania: living in a secondary 
city compared to a town has no effect on demand 
for these kinds of foods, but living in a primary city 
(the largest type) is strongly positively associated 
with demand for these categories (packaged high 
processed foods and meals away from home). 
Headey, Stifel, You, and Guo (2018) showed that 
residing in a rural area, regardless of its degree 
of remoteness from an urban settlement, has a 
meaningful negative impact on child diet diversity 
scores. In the absence of further empirical or 
conceptual literature on this topic, we hypothesize 
that the impact of the rise of megacities on 
consumer demand will be “more of the same”: 
more demand for food diversity, quality, safety, 
convenience, and prestige. Megacity impacts on 
the structure and behavior of FSCs can lead to 
additional changes in consumer demand based on 
changing relative prices. 
2.5. Consequences of consumer 
behavioral change for 
livelihood opportunities
The central effect of changing consumer demand 
for food is to draw labor and livelihoods — 
opportunities — off the farm into the non-farm 
portion of FSCs and entirely outside the food 
system. We review the literature on this move off 
the farm, then consider changing opportunities 
for farmers, before closing with a consideration 
of the implications of the higher capital intensity, 
knowledge, and skill that will be required to capture 
these new opportunities. 
2.5.1 Rising opportunities off the farm
The inverse relationship between a country’s 
income (strongly associated with its level of 
urbanization) and the share of labor on the farm is 
among the most established empirical regularities 
in development economics, forming the basis of 
the earliest development models (Lewis, 1954) and 
elaborated on by numerous authors under the 
rubric of structural transformation of economies 
(see Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014) for 
a review of recent research and Timmer (1988; 2012) 
for applications to agriculture). 
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Tschirley, Snyder, et al. (2015) use this relationship 
together with modeling of the diet transformation 
previously discussed to project movement of labor 
both off the farm and across sectors of the agri-food 
system in East and Southern Africa over 15- and 
30-year periods from 2010. Focusing on primary 
sectors of employment and depending on the level 
of income growth, they projected that employment 
in farming would fall from 75% in 2010 to a range 
of 61% (assuming 4.5% per capita annual growth) 
to 68% (assuming 2% growth) in 2025, then to a 
range of 49% (4.5% growth) to 62% (2% growth) 
by 2040. Due to high population growth absolute 
employment on the farm will rise, even as its share 
of all employment falls. The post-farm segment of 
the agri-food system would increase its share from 
8% to between 10% and 12% by 2025 and 11% to 
14% by 2040. The biggest winner from this process 
would be the economy outside the agri-food 
system, whose share would rise from 18% in 2010 to 
between 22% (2% growth) and 28% (4.5% growth) 
by 2025 and between 27% and 39% by 2040. 
By focusing on an individual’s primary sector of 
employment, these projections put a lower bound 
on the share of the non-farm economy (both 
within the agri-food system and outside it) in total 
employment. Using much of the same data (LSMS-
ISA data from six African countries20) and focusing 
on full-time equivalents (FTEs) rather than primary 
occupation, Dolislager et al. (2020) capture the 
fact that economically active individuals in Africa 
typically engage in multiple livelihoods. They show 
that only 34% of all labor effort (FTE) in Africa was 
spent on own farming around 2015, and even rural 
areas showed only 39%. Together, these are roughly 
one-half the 75% farm share that Tschirley, Snyder, 
et al.  (2015) reported from an overlapping set of 
countries, just 5 years earlier, based on primary 
occupation. 
Focusing on work off the farm, Dolislager et al. 
(2020) show that 25% of all FTE labor — farm and 
all non-farm including that unrelated to food — is 
spent in the post-farm segment of the agri-food 
system, well above the 8% figure (from 5 years 
20  Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
earlier) of Tschirley, Snyder, et al. (2015) and again 
confirming how individuals in Africa engage in 
multiple livelihoods. 
This same research also shows that engagement 
in the off-farm portion of the agri-food system 
increases as a household resides in more densely 
populated areas (Figure 2.5). They do this by 
applying the same classification scheme used by 
IFAD (2019) and Arslan et al. (2020) and found that 
the share of FTEs dedicated to post-farm agri-
food system (AFS) work (including wage and self-
employment) in the 6 African countries increases 
from 22% in the rural hinterland (the least densely 
populated rural areas) to 25% in intermediate 
zones, 26% in peri-urban areas, and 31% in urban 
areas. The share of farming falls across these zones 
from 57% to 38% to 28% before dropping all the 
way to 7% in fully urban areas. Work shares entirely 
outside the agri-food system (non-agri-food wage 
plus non-agri-food self-employment) rise from 22% 
in the hinterland to 47% in peri-urban and 62% in 
urban areas. This more disaggregated view of rural 
spaces is better suited to the population settlement 
patterns previously reviewed, where we showed 
that much of “rural” Africa is relatively densely 
populated. 
Summarizing, urbanization and income growth in 
Africa have already driven a dramatic shift of labor 
effort off the farm and into the midstream and 
downstream of the agri-food system (25% of all 
labor today in the 6 countries analyzed) and outside 
the agri-food system (39%). Continued urbanization 
and income growth can be expected to continue 
this process, with the prospect that in 5–10 years 
roughly two-thirds of all labor even in rural areas will 
take place off the farm. 
2.5.2 Opportunities for farmers
We identify five impacts that the changing structure 
of food demand should have on farmers, and review 
evidence on each. 
#1: Crop mix shift towards high-value crops: First, 
there should be a change in farm production mix 
towards higher value crops such as fresh fruit and 
vegetables and animal products (poultry and eggs, 
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dairy, and meat). This is a direct response to changing 
consumer demand and was theorized by von Thunen 
(1826) nearly 200 years ago. This shift at farm level 
could be inhibited by surging imports of the high 
value products, but in the absence of such a surge, 
the shift would have to come from local production. 
Empirical support for this change is tenuous and 
shallow, with few empirical studies. Headey and Jayne 
(2014) find some support, showing that increasing 
rural population densities on the continent are 
associated primarily with some shifts to higher value 
crops. Yet they also cite FAOSTAT data as showing a 
slight decline in the contribution of non-cereal crops 
to total output in high density African countries. 
Our own review of FAOSTAT data also does not 
support the idea that high value crop production 
has increased its share in total production on the 
continent. Between 1990 and 2018, the ratio of total 
production of staple cereals, roots and tubers, and 
plantains (low value crops) to all other production 
(high value) trended slowly down, from about 36% to 
34%21. 
21  We excluded sugar cane from the analysis because its 
extreme bulkiness meant that it dominated these produc-
tion-based ratios. 
Problems of accuracy with FAOSTAT data are well-
known22, and under-reporting may be a particular 
problem with high value crops such as fruit and 
vegetables and animal products. Opportunities 
created by rising demand are clear, and many 
individual studies speak to areas where high value 
agricultural production — especially for vegetables, 
dairy, and some meats — is rising rapidly to satisfy 
this burgeoning urban demand. For example, 
Chapoto, Hichaambwa and Kabwe (Box 8.2, this 
volume) show that nearly 200,000 farmers have 
entered Zambia’s vegetable market since 2007, 
nearly doubling the share of smallholder farmers 
producing these crops, with a strong reason being 
rising urban demand. Similar dynamics appear 
underway in Ethiopia, where growing urban 
demand has fueled the emergence of peri-urban 
horticultural farming clusters serving expanding 
urban markets for fresh fruits and vegetables 
(Minten, Mohammed, & Tamru, 2020). Various 
writers have documented the rapid rise in dairy 
production in peri-urban areas of Kenya (Kiambi 
et al., 2018; Kiambi et al., 2020; Ngigi et al., 2010). 
Hollinger and Staatz (2015) show rapid growth in 
22  See, for example, Headey and Jayne (2014) who based much 
of their analysis on FAOSTAT data, since it is the available 
source, but warn twice of problems with the data.
Source: Dolislager et al. (2020)
Figure 2.5. Labor full-time equivalent (FTE) shares by functional (self-employment versus wage) and sectoral 
(agri-food system or non-agri-food system) category, East and Southern Africa circa 2014 
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production of some types of meat in West Africa 
since 1980. 
These findings suggest that it is possible there 
has been a greater shift than national data show. 
But recall that Reardon et al. (2019) reported small 
changes in the staples share in consumption in 
Africa, and that Tschirley, Dolislager, et al. (2015) and 
Tschirley, Snyder, et al. (2015) computed modest 
income elasticities of demand for vegetables. 
Furthermore, Bachewe and Minten (2020) show in 
Ethiopia that the prices of nutritious foods (mostly 
animal-source proteins, and fruits and vegetables) 
have risen much more rapidly than the prices 
of obesogenic foods (oils, fats, and sugar) and 
staples between 2007 and 2016, suggesting that 
local production is not keeping pace with rises in 
demand in urban areas. 
Together this evidence suggests that there have 
likely been some shifts in production mix, that they 
have been modest and spotty to date, but that over 
time they likely will become more pronounced and 
broad-based (as long as incomes continue to rise 
and local supply chains are competitive) with special 
emphasis on animal protein, fruit, and perhaps 
vegetables. 
#2: Higher input use: Increased input intensity 
could come from three sources. The first is linked 
to lower total cost of access to inputs for farmers, 
which could stem from three effects. For one, 
shorter average distances between rural and urban 
areas should result in farmers more frequently 
connecting with urban-based input dealers, which 
could lower total costs of such input access due 
to lower transport costs, and lower prices for the 
inputs due both to potentially greater competition 
among dealers in more competitive urban markets 
and lower unit costs for these dealers based on 
higher volumes transacted than would be possible 
with a rural location. More dense rural populations 
could also make it more profitable (through a 
threshold effect) for input dealers to locate in 
rural areas. These rural input dealers may charge 
higher prices due to higher operating costs and 
lower volumes transacted, but their presence could 
increase access and reduce total cost of input 
acquisition for some farmers, primarily those for 
whom traveling to the urban center is infeasible or 
more expensive than any price premium they would 
pay to a local input dealer. 
The second source of input intensification is 
Boserupian intensification based on changing 
relative factor prices (Boserup, 1965). This process 
is driven by the interaction of more dense rural 
populations and greater proximity to urban areas, 
which drives up land prices, changes relative factor 
costs, and makes it more economically rational for 
farmers to intensify with land-saving inputs such 
as fertilizers and pesticides. In other words, inputs 
need only become relatively cheaper compared 
to other factors of production to drive input 
intensification among those farmers that have the 
cash or can otherwise finance input purchases. 
The third contributor to increased input intensity 
could be a relieved cash constraint due to higher 
off-farm incomes (including from remittances), 
interacting with the first two dynamics. 
The empirical record on input intensification 
in Africa is tricky to interpret in part because 
intensification is highly clustered (Sheahan & Barrett, 
2017), meaning that national and continental trends 
hide a great deal of heterogeneity. The broad story 
is that inorganic fertilizer use has grown rapidly 
over the past decade (Ariga, Mabaya, Waithaka, 
& Wanzala-Mlobela, 2019) but remains far below 
levels in other areas of the developing world and is 
driven by maize; that herbicide use has skyrocketed 
since the early 2000s (Haggblade, Minten, Pray, 
Reardon, & Zilberman, 2017); and that whatever 
broad intensification has occurred is strongly related 
to proximity to an urban market (Vandercasteelen, 
Beyene, Minten, & Swinnen, 2018a; 2018b). We 
support each statement in turn. 
Ariga et al. (2019) report that inorganic fertilizer use 
in sub-Saharan Africa rose 8% per year between 
2008 and 2018 but at 15 kg/ha remains far below 
other areas of the world. Forty percent of the 
use in 2017 was for maize. Bachewe and Minten 
(2020) showed that modern input use partly drove 
agricultural productivity growth in Ethiopia but 
42 AFRICA AGRICULTURE STATUS REPORT 2020
that area expansion played a larger role in growth 
in total production. Headey and Jayne (2014) 
anticipated this result, showing that intensification 
in high density areas of the continent was achieved 
primarily through greater intensity of land use 
(mostly declining fallow periods in favor of more 
continuous use) and very little to increased input 
use. Jayne et al. (2019) show that growth in total 
production over the past decade was driven 75% by 
area expansion and only 25% by yield growth. 
Yet Sheahan and Barrett (2017) found tremendous 
variability across 6 countries in fertilizer use, with 
country averages ranging from 26 kg/ha to 57 kg/
ha. They also found “immense” variation in use of 
fertilizer and other chemical inputs across regions 
within countries, for example in Ethiopia where 
three regions far surpass the national average of 
45 kg/ha while 5 regions use less than 10 kg/ha. 
Finally, they showed that nearly half the variation 
in inorganic fertilizer use is related to policy and 
institutional factors at country levels; household and 
plot factors explain much less variation. 
Sheahan and Barret (2017) also suggest that 
agrochemical use is far higher than typically 
recorded, while Haggblade et al. (2017) document 
the explosion in pesticide use (particularly 
herbicides) in West Africa. They show that imports 
rose 8-fold between 2000 and 2013, from about 
US$110 million to over US$800 million. Drivers 
of this dramatic rise have been falling prices due 
to a flood of generic pesticides related to the 
expiration of patent protection for major active 
ingredients, together with rising rural wage rates 
related to urbanization and the growth of off-farm 
employment. 
Examining teff production in Ethiopia, 
Vandercasteelen et al. (2018a) generated results 
strikingly in tune with what we showed about the 
pattern of population settlement in Africa. They 
show that secondary cities have strong positive 
effects on input use because their large numbers 
and wide distribution reduce the distance to urban 
markets for many farmers. However, the size of the 
effect is larger for larger cities: hinterland farmers 
linked to Addis Ababa (fewer than those linked to 
one of the many secondary cities) used more inputs 
and achieved higher yields than farmers lying similar 
distances from secondary cities. Vandercasteelen 
et al. (2018b) showed sharp increases in the use of 
diammonium phosphate (DAP), urea, and improved 
seeds together with higher profits (despite paying 
higher wages to hired labor) as farmers reside closer 
to Addis Ababa. Assima and Tamru (Box 8.1, this 
volume) show similarly sharp spatial gradients for 
herbicide use in Ethiopia and Mali, with rapidly 
rising use related to rapidly falling prices closer to 
cities. 
Rural non-farm income has risen with urbanization 
and food system transformation. The empirical 
record on reinvestment of this income into farming 
is mixed, however. Mathenge, Smale, and Tschirley 
(2014) found that off-farm income generally 
competes with maize intensification in Kenya. 
Smale, Kusunose, Mathenge, and Alia (2016) found 
a negative relationship with maize intensification 
at low income levels but a positive relationship at 
higher income levels. On the other hand, Oseni 
and Winters (2009) found a positive relationship 
between off-farm income and farm expenses in 
Nigeria, in particular on labor and fertilizer, though 
this effect varies across regions. Maertens (2009) 
found that access to employment in export agro-
industry alleviates farmers’ liquidity constraints in 
Senegal and increases agricultural production. 
Summarizing, empirical literature remains sparse 
but is beginning to capture increased use of 
modern inputs in African agriculture. Progress 
is rapid but from very low levels and shows 
great variation across and within countries. 
Urban proximity (and thus the importance of the 
decentralized urbanization we document earlier in 
the chapter) is an important driver of this emerging 
trend, and rural non-farm income can, under 
conducive circumstances, also relieve liquidity 
constraints and allow greater crop intensification. 
#3: More marketing: The third expected impact on 
farmers of the human settlement and income trends 
we identified is more marketing of agricultural 
production. This effect stems from three facts: (1) 
market-dependent consumers outnumber farmers 
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(urbanization plus movement into rural non-farm 
employment); (2) these consumers have higher 
incomes; and (3) market penetration and high 
population densities in rural areas means that rural 
people also are purchasing more of their food. 
Surprisingly, empirical research on this topic is 
extremely thin. One flurry of research on “market 
participation” of smallholders in Africa took place 
in the mid-2000s (Alene et al. 2008; Barrett, 2008; 
Boughton et al., 2007). Using data from around 
2000, these studies came too early after the start of 
the rise in per capita incomes on the continent, did 
not focus on the impact of market proximity, and 
were also unable to examine trends at household 
level in crop marketing due to lack of panel data. 
Later work (for example, Mather, Boughton, & 
Jayne, 2013) stresses the impact of technology and 
household resource endowments on participation 
(much like Barrett (2008) and Boughton et al. (2007)), 
with less importance found for proximity to market. 
A second area of study is contract farming (which 
is, by definition, market-oriented) but the focus is 
heavily on the impacts of participation and less 
on its determinants and trends. A more current 
burgeoning literature on African food system 
transformation focuses primarily on diets (Keding, 
Msuya, Maass, & Krawinkel, 2011; Tschirley, 
Dolislager, et al., 2015; Tschirley, Snyder, et al. 
2015; Worku, Dereje, Minten, & Hirvonen, 2017) 
and nutrition (Gillespie & van den Bold et al., 2017; 
Popkin, 2017) or the midstream (Reardon, 2015; 
Reardon et al. 2019 ). If it does address farm issues 
(Jayne, Chamberlin, & Benfica, 2018) it takes a 
broader focus that does not examine impacts of 
these transformations on household level marketing 
behavior. 
In short, empirical support for the obvious 
proposition that increased proximity to urban areas 
should increase farmer marketing behavior is very 
weak because the research has not been done; this 
is an important area for more research. 
#4: More profitable marketing: The fourth effect 
on farmers should be more profitable marketing, 
stemming from two sources. First, shorter transport 
distances mean that consumers are now closer to 
farmers, which should reduce marketing margins, 
some of which should go to farmers (with the share 
that farmers capture depending on elasticities of 
supply and demand). The second source of more 
profitable marketing should be a volume effect, 
based on two factors: lower unit costs per kilometer 
transported due to higher production volumes per 
farm (this based again on the much lower ratio of 
farmers to non-farmers), and more dense clustering 
of farms, which further increases volumes, reduces 
unit costs for traders and transporters, and should 
in part raise prices for farmers. 
Vandercasteelen et al. (2018a; 2018b) provide strong 
support for this expectation in the production and 
marketing of teff in Ethiopia, but we find no other 
literature that directly examines how the profitability 
of agricultural production varies with proximity to 
urban areas. 
However, an indirect indicator of the business 
attractiveness of farming in Africa today is the rise of 
medium-scale, entrepreneurial farmers. This trend 
was first identified by research around the effect 
of “agri-food industry transformation”, including 
the rise of supermarkets, on smallholder farmers in 
Africa. Neven, Odera, Reardon, and Wang (2009) 
found that supermarkets in Nairobi sourced their 
vegetables from wholesale markets and primarily 
medium-sized horticultural farmers near the city, 
echoing similar shifts decades earlier in Latin 
America. Much of this literature emphasized the 
exclusion of smallholder farmers from these high-
value modernized markets, due to standards for 
quality and regularity of deliveries that smallholders 
found difficult to meet. Those smallholders that did 
enter the markets, however, were typically found 
to earn higher profits (Minten, Randrianarison, & 
Swinnen, 2009). 
Later research by Jayne and colleagues (Jayne 
et al., 2014; Jayne et al., 2016; Jayne et al., 2019) 
documents the much broader rise of medium-
scale farmers in relatively land-abundant countries, 
producing a similar range of crops to smallholder 
farmers. Jayne et al. (2019) found that farmers 
cultivating between 5 ha and 100 ha accounted 
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for between 40% and 60% of the increase in total 
agricultural output over 6–10 years in Ghana, 
Malawi, Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and 
Zambia. 
Overall, the evidence compiled by Vandercasteelen 
et al. (2018a; 2018b), Neven et al. (2009), and 
Jayne et al. (2014; 2016; 2019) paints a consistent 
picture of agri-food system transformation and 
associated increased urbanization driving greater 
profit possibilities in farming, which new medium-
scale farmers and a limited number of smallholder 
farmers are taking advantage of.
2.5.3 Increasing capital intensity and skill 
 requirements
A distinguishing feature of the new opportunities aris-
ing to serve Africa’s urban food demand is that doing 
so requires more capital intensity and greater knowl-
edge, skill, and organization. This fact means that, 
unless effective policy and programmatic responses 
can be found, only a small subset of the hundreds of 
millions of smallholder farmers and micro and small-
scale agribusinesses will be able to compete in this 
new environment over the medium term. 
Daunting challenges for small-scale farmers: 
The new demand patterns of consumers lead 
increasingly to changes in the structure (scale) and 
behavior of FSCs that pose major challenges for 
smallholder farmers. In the emerging modernized 
food systems of Africa, agribusiness firms want 
quality, regularity of delivery, demonstrable safety, 
and scale to reduce unit costs. These requirements 
are most predominant in perishable supply chains 
such as fresh fruit and vegetables and animal 
products. The early supermarket literature (Minten 
et al., 2009; Neven et al., 2009; Weatherspoon & 
Reardon, 2003) highlighted the broad exclusion 
of smallholder farmers from supermarket fresh 
produce supply chains, except to the extent that 
these chains purchased from wholesale markets 
(though even there, it is the upper quarter or less 
of smallholder farmers that supply the vast majority 
of fresh produce). Reardon, Barrett, Berdegué, 
and Swinnen (2009) concluded that smallholder 
farmers can be included but in small numbers and 
not those in hinterland areas or that are asset poor. 
Tschirley et al. (2018) reviewed the evidence and 
food system transformation in Africa and suggested 
that 10–30% of the “commercial farmer” households 
(already better equipped and more market-oriented) 
and a smaller portion of the “pre-commercial” 
households might be able to compete in these 
emerging markets in the medium-term. The major 
role that medium-scale farmers have played in rising 
production in seven countries spread across West, 
Central, East, and Southern Africa, as documented 
by Jayne et al. (2019) and reviewed in this chapter 
(section 5.2), suggests that the turn towards larger, 
better capitalized farmers is already well underway. 
A coming concentration of the midstream: big 
challenges for SMEs: Tschirley et al. (2018) and 
Reardon et al. (2019) demonstrate that MSMEs 
(micro, small, and medium enterprises) dominate 
the midstream and downstream of African food 
systems. Roughly 90% of all food retailing takes place 
through such firms; processing of maize meal in 
Tanzania is almost entirely in the hands of such firms; 
and even in Zambia where large-scale trading firms 
have penetrated more than in most African countries 
(drawn by the substantial large-scale farmer sector), 
they carried only 11% of the maize trade in 2015 
(Sitko, Chisanga, Tschirley, & Jayne, 2017). 
Part of the reason for the limited presence of large 
companies in Africa’s food systems is the daunting 
infrastructural and policy challenges they face. 
Poor physical infrastructure (roads, energy, water, 
and ports) dramatically increases the costs of 
operation. Heavy bureaucratic procedures further 
increase these costs. Ad hoc border closures during 
food crises (Tschirley & Jayne, 2010) can lead to 
enormous losses. And because the medium and 
large-scale farming sector is not yet large enough 
to supply all the product that most need, they 
face the costs of assembly from large numbers of 
small farmers or of sourcing product in dramatically 
congested and inefficient wholesale markets. 
Yet the size of the African urban market and its 
rapid growth (at least until recently) has increasingly 
attracted large players (Reardon et al., 2019; 
Tschirley et al., 2018). Policy is also improving, 
with an encouraging recent example being the 
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very limited closure of borders in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The African Continental 
Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) is moving forward 
and could mark a milestone in improved policy 
that allows scaling of investment in production, 
processing, and trade and much lower costs of 
operation. If policies continue to improve, more 
large-scale investment will be attracted, and the “J 
curve” of the evolution of concentration will begin 
to enter the phase of rapid consolidation, increases 
in scale of operation, and progressive exclusion 
of micro and small firms (the right side of the “J”; 
Reardon et al., 2019). 
Africa is behind other areas of the world in this 
process of consolidation, and the stalling of growth 
over the past five years may have further slowed the 
process. Yet the COVID-19 shock may give renewed 
impetus to consolidation (Reardon, 2020). 
Concerns about employment: The likelihood 
of rising capital intensity raises concerns about 
employment on a continent where the youth 
population (those 15–24 years old) is projected to 
double by 2050, compared to expected declines in 
Asia and Latin America (Arslan et al. , 2020; IFAD, 
2019). Concerns are compounded when considering 
the near certainty that manufacturing will not create 
the levels of employment in Africa that were seen in 
the West in the last century or even in East Asia and 
areas of South Asia over the past 30 years23.
The evidence on how rapidly this consolidation is 
taking place is mixed. What is clear is that medium 
and large-scale firms are rapidly expanding (far 
beyond any such private sector footprint of two 
and three decades ago) even as micro and small-
scale firms innovate and maintain very large market 
shares in some areas. At retail, Tschirley et al. 
(2017) note the dramatic expansion of modern 
supermarkets and convenience stores in Dar es 
Salaam over the past 15–20 years, while noting that 
23  This difficulty relates to many factors: the dominance of 
East Asia, especially China, in this sphere; the post-industrial 
structure of consumer demand in developed countries where 
services take up a rapidly expanding share of consumer 
expenditure; and automation that drives down labor to capital 
ratios and leads to much more rapid deindustrialization in 
employment even than in output. 
this growth has been much less visible in secondary 
cities. Though there have been few if any estimates 
of supermarket market shares since the boom in the 
supermarket literature in the 2000s, overall shares 
likely remain in the single digits outside of capital 
cities of nearly every country except South Africa. 
Tschirley et al. (2017) and Reardon et al. (2020) also 
note that some large industrial food companies in 
Tanzania are losing market share in the maize meal 
market in the face of a huge expansion of micro and 
small processors, while these same large industrial 
firms are seeing major growth in other food items 
(for example, sales of Bakhresa up 10 times in 10 
years, and of MeTL up 40 times in 15 years) and 
are also expanding regionally. Companies like 
IndoFoods in Nigeria (Reardon, et al., 2019) and 
Zambeef in Zambia are also growing rapidly both 
domestically and regionally. Chapter 4 provides 
more detail on this issue. 
Addressing this challenge is a thorny problem. 
Tschirley et al. (2017) caution that the popularity 
of programs to promote SMEs far outruns any 
evidence of their effectiveness, and note that 
the little empirical that does exist tends to show 
modest impacts and low rates of return. Where such 
investments are made, they suggest that they focus 
on clusters of firms, to reduce unit costs of service 
delivery and maximize learning. Legislation around 
secured transactions reform built around collateral 
registries might also help small firms gain access 
to credit. Finally, improved transport and energy 
infrastructure in rural areas might help attenuate the 
current very heavy concentration of food processing 
in urban areas, and allow the emergence of more 
small-scale firms in rural areas or in secondary cities. 
Solar and micro or mini-grids may be part of this 
push for more distributed food processing (and 
small-scale manufacturing in general) in favor of 
higher employment ratios. 
2.6 Looking ahead 
Growth in urban populations and incomes are 
the fundamental drivers of the opportunities 
that African urban areas will generate for food 
system participants over the coming years. We 
argued in section 4 that these two shocks have 
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independent effects on diets and thus, through 
FSC restructuring, on the range, distribution, and 
level of opportunities available to food system 
participants. The effect is far larger, however, when 
the two dynamics occur together, jointly driving 
very rapid transformation of diets — making food 
more purchased, more perishable, more processed, 
and more prepared — and of FSCs, and thus of the 
opportunities available to food system participants. 
These trends are robustly predictable. Other 
factors will also come into play, however. Local 
conditions — the resilience and diversity of 
the local production base, the country’s level 
of development, and the strength of its local 
food culture — will drive spatial variability in the 
particular ways in which these processes unfold. 
Regulatory response to the increasingly rapid rise 
of overweight and obesity and associated non-
communicable diseases (diabetes, hypertension, 
and others) may also lead to variations across 
countries and modify the particular types of 
processed foods that get produced. 
COVID-19 is likely to have major and potentially 
opposite effects. The disease is likely to speed-up 
consolidation in the midstream and downstream 
that is also driven by diet change and food 
system transformation. It is also likely to speed 
the movement to online platforms (Reardon, 
2020), thereby reinforcing the rising need for skill 
and capital mentioned earlier. However, it will 
dramatically reduce income growth at least over 
the next two years, which will tend to hold back 
the transformation process. Climate change will 
have major effects and these, too, will vary across 
countries, but their consideration is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.
2.6.1 Past projections
Tschirley, Dolislager, et al. (2015), Tschirley, 
Snyder, et al. (2015) and Zhou and Staatz (2016) 
show this for East and Southern Africa and West 
Africa respectively. For East and Southern Africa, 
Tschirley, Dolislager, et al. (2015) and Tschirley, 
Snyder, et al. (2015) projected that, with real annual 
per capita income growth equal to the average 
of the preceding 10 years (4.5%), overall market 
demand for food between 2010 and 2025 would 
increase 2.8 times led by perishable products (3.2 
times) and especially the most highly processed 
perishable products (3.6 times). These massive 
increases were a result of the rapid income growth 
that increases demand for food and especially for 
value added in food, and continued urbanization 
and rural densification that leads to greater reliance 
on markets for food. At a growth rate of only 2% 
per year, overall market size would double, again 
led by perishable and especially highly processed 
perishable foods. These large increases even with 
a modest 2% per capita growth are driven by high 
population growth, continued urbanization, and 
increasing reliance on markets. 
Zhou and Staatz (2016) applied similar methods 
to West Africa to project increase in demand from 
2010 to 2030 (20 years compared to the 15 used in 
Tschirley, Snyder, et al., 2015). Assuming continued 
high per capita income growth, their results 
pointed to increase in demand of over 4.5 times for 
dairy products and meat, and 2–3 times for other 
commodities. Growth of one percentage point 
below previous growth would still increase demand 
for dairy products and meat by nearly 4 times, and 
for other products again in the range of 2–3 times. 
Considering that growth in the farming labor force 
would be very slow in these growth scenarios, this 
level of growth implies massive new opportunities 
for farmers and agribusiness firms, especially the 
millions of SME firms making up the “hidden 
middle” of these FSCs (Reardon et al., 2019). 
2.6.2 Uncertainty around drivers
Looking to the future, evidence strongly suggests 
that urbanization is likely to continue at a rapid 
pace. Both UN and Africapolis show high growth in 
the urban population share regardless of income 
trends. Jedwab and Vollrath (2015) show that 
global urbanization has been trending rapidly 
upwards since the 1500s independent of income: 
urbanization today is 25–30 percentage points 
higher than in 1500 at comparable levels of income. 
Income growth is far less certain. Though not 
known at the time, both the Tschirley, Snyder et al. 
(2015b) and Zhou and Staatz (2016) analyses were 
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done at the end of Africa’s 15-year growth spurt, 
when optimism about future growth prospects still 
reigned. Even at that time, however, skeptical voices 
were being raised (Rodrik, 2014). These voices 
continued into 2018 (McMillan et al., 2017; Rodrik, 
2018), struggling to find ways in which African growth 
could continue at high rates without the rapid 
industrialization that drove previous sustained growth 
but that is increasingly difficult to achieve today. 
Since 2013, as we have shown, growth in average 
real per capita consumption and GDP has been 
negative. In 2019, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) forecast 3.5% growth in GDP for the continent 
that year and 3.6% in 2020, barely positive in per 
capita terms and well below the lowest projections 
in the studies mentioned above. Now, with the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the severe locust outbreak 
in East Africa, the Fall Armyworm infestation since 
2016, and growing security problems in the Sahel, 
the IMF forecasts GDP growth of negative 3.2% 
in 2020 (negative 5.4% per capita!) and a recovery 
to 1.1% overall (still negative in per capita terms) 
in 2021 “assuming that the pandemic abates, and 
lockdowns ease further in the second half of 2020” 
(IMF, 2020, p. 5). By the end of 2021 under these 
projections, per capita incomes on the continent 
would be back to where they were 10 years ago. If 
the pandemic instead worsens and economic life 
is further disrupted, the regression will be even 
greater. 
In urban areas this negative income growth is likely 
to be most severe among the poorest, who are 
reliant on informal markets requiring in-person 
interactions, which have fallen dramatically as a 
result of the pandemic. Because the mass of low-
income consumers in Africa have been central 
to the diet transformation and resulting growth 
in farm- and off-farm opportunities (Tschirley, 
Dolislager, et al., 2015), severe economic shocks to 
this group will have large impacts on growth and 
transformation in the system. 
A ray of hope is that the IMF projections are the 
least negative for the African economies that are 
not dependent on natural resources or tourism. For 
these countries, if Africa is able to continue opening 
its local markets within a regional free trade area 
and make associated investments in trade and 
productive capacity, it may be able to sustain some 
positive growth in per capita incomes for some 
period of time. 
2.6.3 Local food cultures and emerging health 
 concerns
Our fundamental contention is that local food 
cultures and emerging concerns about the health 
effects of poor diets among the non-poor are 
likely to lead to flourishing innovation without 
meaningfully altering the basic dynamic of more 
purchased, perishable processed, and prepared 
food. This argument is based on three factors. 
First, demand for more diverse food as incomes 
rise strikes us as a fundamental human tendency. In 
section 4.4 we reinterpreted Bennett’s law as “an 
expectation of rising demand for food diversity … 
and for a broader set of food attributes as incomes 
rise.” This diversity is served by greater reliance on 
markets— more purchased food — and the large 
number of products they can make available. Food 
processing outside the home is a major avenue 
through which this demand for diversity can be 
satisfied and becomes a major focus of innovation 
in the midstream of FSCs. 
Second, higher demand for more perishable 
foods, especially animal products, as incomes rise 
is a robust empirical pattern over many decades. 
Perishable animal products are, at the level of the 
consumer (albeit not from a whole FSC perspective) 
extremely efficient providers of protein, fat, and 
minerals. For people coming out of poverty, such 
foods almost certainly improve nutritional outcomes 
rather than worsening them (as they increasingly do 
in rich economies). At this stage of development 
of most African countries, it is difficult to imagine 
a development path that does not lead to more 
consumption of these products. 
Third, consumers will always have a higher 
demand for convenience when they perceive a 
higher opportunity cost of their time. Urbanization 
increases this perceived opportunity cost of time for 
many of reasons, from longer commutes to dual-
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income couples to the basic psychology of being 
in an environment with many people in motion 
pursuing innumerable activities in front of you. 
Food processing and preparation outside the home 
respond directly to this fundamental demand. 
Local food cultures will influence the particular 
staple foods, animal products, and fresh produce 
that consumers demand, the way in which they 
are prepared, and the particular foods they are 
combined with. They will also influence the kinds 
of processed and prepared foods that consumers 
desire. We find implausible in the extreme, however, 
to expect them to diminish the fundamental 
demands for diversity and convenience that come 
with rising incomes and urbanization. 
Emerging concerns about the deleterious health 
effects of ultra-processed food consumption in 
middle and higher income countries, and among 
the middle and upper classes of low income 
countries, is leading to much new regulatory activity 
in Latin America (HLPE, 2020, Box 8) and is putting 
such options on the table in other areas of the 
developing world. In similar vein to our argument 
above, we expect that such new regulations, 
rather than stopping or seriously slowing the trend 
towards more food processing, will lead to new 
innovation around more healthy but still highly 
palatable and convenient foods in the attempt to 
meet fundamental consumer demands for diversity, 
convenience, and status in consumer diets. 
2.6.4 Concluding remarks
Rapid urbanization has transformed the face of 
Africa over the past few decades. Paired with 
rapid growth in per capita incomes since 2000, 
it generated dramatic change in the foods 
that African consumers demand and drove big 
improvements in the opportunities available to 
farmers, micro-enterprises, and consumers. Yet the 
continent now finds itself at a point of profound 
uncertainty, in the midst of a five-year stagnation of 
growth and dealing now with the massive challenge 
of the COVID-19 pandemic accentuated by severe 
regional crises in the Sahel and East Africa. The 
result is that the projections of just five years ago 
now have little if any likelihood of being realized. 
This does not mean that transformation in the 
directions we have discussed will stop, for two 
reasons. First, it is very likely that urbanization 
will continue at a relatively rapid pace, for the 
reasons discussed above. And as we have said, 
urbanization alone will have some, though much 
less, transformative effect on eating habits and thus 
on structural change in the economy. 
The second reason that transformation need not 
come to a halt is that Africa has much room for 
increasing economic growth through improved 
policy and investment, and both are improving. 
The most recent example is that few if any border 
closings were imposed during the COVID-19 
pandemic, in stark contrast to previous behavior 
by governments faced with food crises (Tschirley & 
Jayne, 2010). The AfCFTA is moving forward and 
promises reduced costs of trade, greater scale of 
operation, and rising productivity and incomes. 
This provides some hope that persistently low 
intra-Africa trade might begin to rise (Awokuse, 
et al., 2019), thus allowing firms not yet able 
to compete in the global market to expand 
operations regionally and potentially to develop 
the knowledge and capabilities to compete 
globally. Though various sub-regional free trade 
agreements on the continent have done little to 
reduce costs and increase volumes of intra-Africa 
trade, some optimism now exists that forces are 
aligning to make this time different and take a 
major step towards growth-enhancing policies on 
the continent. Infrastructural investment has also 
been increasing, up in value in 2018 by 24% over 
2017 and 33% over the 2015–2017 average (ICA, 
2018). Continuing this trend, prioritizing sectors 
effectively, and delivering on the promise of AfCFTA 
could go a long way towards helping the continent 
regain its footing in the wake of its own faltering 
and COVID-19, and resume the level of growth and 
transformation that many anticipated five years ago.
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